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 Abstract 
 
A properly radical enactivism – one that eschews the idea that all mentality is necessarily contentful 
and representational – has better prospects of unifying psychology than does traditional cognitivism. 
This paper offers a five-step argument in support of this claim. The first section advances the view 
that a principled way of characterizing psychology’s subject matter is what is required if it is to be 
regarded as a special science. In this light, section two examines why and how cognitivism continues 
to be regarded as the best potential unifier for the discipline. But the third section exposes a serious 
problem about the scope of cognitivism that occurs because it ascribes properties to basic minds that 
only belong to more sophisticated minds built atop them. In a nutshell, the root problem is that 
cognitivism relies on folk psychological models of mental states when it assumes that all mentality is 
contentful. Although this gives cognitivism its intuitive appeal, it also makes it too limited to provide 
a general model of the mind. Radical enactivism’s way of understanding mentality as embodied 
activity, it is argued, avoids this and provides a more appropriate means of understanding basic forms 
of mentality. Against the charge that radical enactivism is also limited in scope, the final section 
argues that it is inclusive enough to allow for and recognize the emergence of language-based folk 
psychological modes of mentality, thus making it the superior potential unifier for psychology. 
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Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology to Radical Enactivism 
 
 Can there be a unified psychology? Is this a real possibility or a pipedream, as the title of 
Sternberg’s (2005) edited volume on this topic provocatively asks? It is hard to imagine that there 
will ever be a single conceptual framework that defines the subject matter of psychology which 
readily commands the allegiance of all working psychologists. Let us suppose such ‘unification’ isn’t 
on the cards. Does it follow that psychology lacks unity? No. The possibility of a unified psychology 
has never depended on articulating a singular vision that descriptively captures the actual working 
commitments of practicing psychologists such that it would readily command their universal 
allegiance. Creating such a consensus would require identifying and collecting together all of the 
disparate operating assumptions of all the diverse sub-branches that comprise the discipline. It would 
also require coherently combining these – a task only possible on the assumption that they are 
consistent and compatible with one another. Surely, that is a fool’s errand. One would hardly expect 
such an enterprise to succeed, and it would be unclear what would be gained from such an endeavor; 
since working assumptions shift and change, attempting to unify psychology in this way wouldn’t 
have any lasting value. 
 Psychology’s unification does not depend on synthesizing what those working in its various 
branches happen to think. Rather it is unified because there is a principled way of defining and 
demarcating its subject matter. Articulating this would provide a regulative and legitimizing, not 
merely descriptive, account of ‘the psychological’ that could focus the efforts of many and varied 
sub-disciplines. It would also provide the means of settling border disputes with other scientific 
disciplines, of knowing where the boundaries of psychology begin and end.  
 If psychology is to be unified then what is needed is a convincing account of what psychological 
phenomena are and where they fit into the larger world order. Physics is the most general natural 
science, but its laws are compatible with the existence of other laws as well – laws that detail and 
describe the antics of distinctive phenomena with which physics does not deal; laws of the special 
sciences. In line with this, it is natural to suppose that the boundaries of the various special sciences 
are fixed by the peculiar nature of what they deal with in their autonomous domains. This assumes 
that there is a single, coherent story to be told, in principle, about the phenomena of interest to each 
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special science, one that makes it possible to say how they inter-relate and interface harmoniously 
with other phenomena. To complete that story would be to provide a single, unified vision of the 
whole of nature. Is it conceivable that psychology is already a well-defined special science that 
operates in its own, quite distinct and autonomous domain?  
 
Cognitivist Unification: Might the ‘I’s have it? 
  
Psychology’s most recent attempt at conceptual unification, cognitivism – the brainchild of the 
cognitive revolution of the 1970s – is still widely regarded as the best hope of unifying psychology. 
We are confidently assured that: 
 
The unity of psychology as a science is to be found in its definition as the science of mental life, 
and its explanation of individual behavior in terms of mental states (Kihlstrom 2004, p. 1243) 
 
 Very well, but which notion of mental state is meant do the all-important work of defining and 
thus unifying psychology? Putnam (1967) articulated a brand of functionalism that advanced a 
powerful proposal about the nature of mental states, defining them in terms of their abstract functions. 
His aim was to make transparent “the kind of functional organization that is necessary and sufficient 
for a given psychological state, as well as a precise definition of the notion ‘psychological state” 
(Putnam 1967/2008, p. 45, emphasis added).  
 Today’s cognitivism goes beyond the austere and abstract functionalism of the Putnam-variety, 
operating with a richer and more powerful conception of mental states. Cognitivism agrees with 
functionalism that psychology is ultimately only concerned with the mental states of individuals, but 
it understands mental states to possess both functional and representational properties, and it assumes 
that these vary for specific kinds of mental state depending on the particular role these kind of state 
play in the mental economy.  Thus some mental states have the function of representing the way 
individuals take the world to be, while others have the function of representing how individuals 
require the world to be. Psychological behaviour ensues from, and is explained by, the interaction of 
such contentful, representational states. Psychology is, accordingly, defined as the science concerned 
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to provide a distinctive type of explanation – it explains what causes or is caused by an individual’s 
inner representational states. In its standard guise, cognitivism is methodologically and 
metaphysically committed to Individualism, Intellectualism, and Internalism. Call this the I-approach 
to psychology.  
 Psychologists who subscribe to the I-approach hold that the internal representational states of 
living organisms are the distinctive subject matter of psychology. Of course, this is not to deny that 
some psychologists take an interest in other non-psychological features and factors. That is practically 
necessary. But such interest is only incidental; such features and factors are only of concern because 
of their potential to causally influence the production and interaction of inner representational states. 
To adopt the I-approach to psychology is to accept a fundamental ideological commitment that 
requires giving center stage to what goes on in the intellectual insides of individuals. Notably, the I-
approach is driven by a specific proposal about the subject matter of psychology – viz. that mental 
states are essentially contentful and that they play certain roles in the cognitive economy. It is 
ideological commitments of this sort that have the potential to demarcate, define and – thus – unify 
psychology. 
 
Cognitivism, Folk Psychology and their limits 
 
This may all sound good, but there is a problem. If cognitivism is to unify psychology, then the model 
of mind it proposes – that which it takes to be definitive of the psychological – must apply universally 
to all psychological phenomena. Its model will have to articulate what is constitutive of the mental 
across the board. The trouble is that the traditional cognitive model of mind is ill suited for this task. 
This is because its ways of characterizing mental states is too deeply rooted in and tied to an 
everyday, folk psychological conception of mind.  
 This may not be immediately obvious but some have worked hard to expose this connection. For 
example, according to Ramsey (2007) cognitivism is crucially committed to a representational 
account of mind but it also gives “rise to an outlook on representation that amounts to a sort of merger 
between classical computational theory and folk psychology” (Ramsey 2007, p. 38). Why so? What’s 
the connection? Well, on the one hand, cognitivism embraces the view that “cognition is computation, 
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which [is] … understood as a form of quasi-linguistic-symbol manipulation done in accordance with 
specifiable rules” (p. 39). But, on the other hand, cognitivism also regards what is processed as 
essentially representational: the mental contents that computational processes manipulate represent 
the world as being in certain ways. Thus the mind both represents and computes. Given this, Ramsey 
(2007) astutely asks: 
 
What type of representational notion is invoked in computational explanations of cognitive 
processes? The answer proposed is, the same type of representational notions that are invoked by 
commonsense psychology. Computational processes are seen as a mechanized version of folk 
psychological reasoning, and this is only possible if the symbols being manipulated are viewed as 
analogues of familiar commonsense mental representations (p. 45, see also p. 46).  
 
It is thus no accident that the mental states and processes that cognitivism takes to define the very 
essence of the psychological are “scientific analogues for beliefs, desires, ideas, thoughts, and similar 
representational posits of folk psychology” (ibid., p. 38).   
 The catch is that the folk psychological conception of mind has its home in the ways linguistically 
competent adult humans sometimes make sense of themselves and others. It is thus ill-suited to be the 
basis for a general model of the nature of all psychological or mental states (For a detailed argument 
see Hutto and Myin 2013). Machery (2009) puts his finger on the source of the trouble. He notes that 
when it comes to understanding basic minds: 
 
The most natural strategy is to focus on the propositional attitudes we are most familiar with 
(beliefs, desires, wishes, etc.) by contrast to the propositional attitudes used by psychologists to 
explain our cognitive competence or our behavior (e.g. Chomsky’s cognizing). [Yet,] The 
ascription of the latter attitudes is often controversial. Furthermore, psychologists have not 
developed specific principles for the ascription of these attitudes, rather their ascription 
piggybacks on the way people ascribe familiar propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires 
(Machery 2009, p. 42) 
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It is doubtful that that we can supply a workable theory of the content of such imagined subpersonal 
attitudes. This is surely so as long as we rely on folk psychological models of the properties of such 
states. This is because folk psychology conceives of mental states as possessing properties that, at 
best, only some mental phenomena actually possess; the features of minds it assumes are not features 
of mental phenomena across the board. 
 Philosophers have long been aware of this problem, and it has encouraged them to suppose that 
the explanatory posits of a mature scientific psychology are unlikely to resemble those of folk 
psychology. Ramsey (2007) argues persuasively that – contra cognitivism – our best scientific 
theories about the mind do not incorporate anything like the kinds of representations that folk 
psychology trades in (and some might not be committed to the existence of any kind of contentful 
representations). Specifically, “the crucial folk psychological tenets … [under threat] are the claims 
that propositional attitudes are functionally discrete, semantically interpretable states that play a 
causal role in the production of behaviour” (Ramsey et al. 1991, p. 97).  
 Taking its lead from folk psychology’s conception of mental states, cognitivism need not assume 
that all mental states are propositional attitudes per se but it does assume that the mental states are, 
always and everywhere, contentful states of some sort or other. It assumes that each type of mental 
state is defined by its functional profile and the kind of content that it bears or possesses. The 
commitment to content is key. As Seager observes “The whole thrust of cognitive science is that there 
are sub-personal contents and sub-personal operations that are truly cognitive in the sense that these 
operations can be properly explained only in terms of these contents” (1999, p. 27, emphasis added). 
Adherence to cognitivism requires acceptance of “the general idea of inner states that bear contents” 
(Clark 2002, p. 386).  
 This commitment is cognitivism’s Achilles’ heel. For arguably, there are no such animals as sub-
personal ‘contents’ – i.e. there are certainly no pre-linguistic mental ‘contents’ of the appropriate kind 
to enter into sub-personal causal commerce (for a book-length argument on this score see Hutto and 
Myin 2013). There are good reasons to suppose that basic minds are not populated with such entities. 
 That may seem like bad news, but it is not since positing contentful representations is not 
necessary in order to understand the operations of basic minds. We can go a long way (even if not the 
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whole way) in making sense of very complex, elaborate and sophisticated worldly engagements 
without assuming they involve content or mental representations.  
 In sum, there are excellent reasons to conclude that cognitivism is not able to provide a properly 
unifying account of the subject matter of psychology. Because it takes its inspiration from folk 
psychology its model of the mind only applies within a limited, quite parochial psychological domain.  
 
Radical Enactivism – A Better Unifier? 
 
Since the appearance of the groundbreaking The Embodied Mind in 1991 over two decades ago, 
Embodied or Enactive, E-approaches, to the mind – have proved fruitful and fecund for 
understanding and investigating the mind. In stressing the essential link between mentality and 
embodied and embedded activity the express aim of the original version of enactivism was to oppose 
and serve as an antidote to those approaches to mind that “take representation as their central notion” 
(ibid., p. 172). Radical versions of enactivism hold that organismic activity – engaging with features 
of environments in specifiable ways – suffices for the most fundamental kinds of cognition. In line 
with this, many researchers working on diverse topics in philosophy, psychology and cognitive 
science now regularly emphasize the non-representational but mindful interactions with the world and 
others. 
 E-approaches have generated a great variety of fresh proposals about many topics, including: 
perception, intentionality, emotion, memory, social cognition and consciousness (see, e.g., Stewart et 
al (2010) for an overview). These proposals break new ground precisely because they set out from a 
quite different place than cognitivism when it comes to thinking about the basic nature of mind. E-
approaches reject I-thinking as a way of understanding the most fundamental and general forms of 
mentality, offering a new and quite different model of mind. Enactivism is inspired by the insight that 
the mental is to be understood in terms of engaged, embodied activity taking its inspiration from the 
self-organizing activity of living beings.  
 Thus, for example, Thompson (2007) tells us “life and mind share a set of basic organizational 
properties, and the organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those 
fundamental to life. Mind is life-like and life is mind-like” (p. 128). Noë (2009) maintains that:  
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What biology brings into focus is the living being, but where we discern life, we have everything 
we need to discern mind … You can’t both acknowledge the existence of the organism and at the 
same time view it as just a locus of processes or physiochemical mechanisms (p. 41). 
 
 To understand mentality, however complex and sophisticated it may be, it is necessary to start by 
appreciating how living beings dynamically interact with their environments, both shaping and being 
shaped by those encounters: ultimately, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference 
to on-going interactions between organisms and their environments. Followers of this new movement 
question – in more or less radical ways – the sharp divide between what is mindless, mechanical, 
dispositional and behavioural and the properly mental, representational, intentional and phenomenal. 
 Radical enactivism offers a different way of making sense of the intentional, end-directed 
character of organismic activity, one that does not assume the existence of contentful mental 
representations (see Hutto 2011a, Hutto and Myin 2013). Radical enactivism firmly sets it face 
against computationally inspired cognitivism and its I-conceptions of the mind – those that 
characterize mentality as essentially disembodied and de-contextualized. E-approaches reject the view 
that cognition is essentially an off-stage, behind-the-scenes computational and calculative activity that 
can be cleanly distinguished from the messy details of how organisms exist in and interact with their 
environments. As Froese (2012) observes: 
 
What once seemed to be the greatest strength of [cognitivism], namely that its principles could be 
studied by computer science irrespective of biological or phenomenological considerations, has 
turned out to be its greatest weakness. Ultimately, … the absolute logical distinction between 
cognition on the one hand and brain–body–world on the other prevents a genuine core articulation 
between the different disciplines from taking place. (p. 210) 
 
 In rejecting the idea that our primary engagements with the world are content-involving, radical 
versions of enactivism and embodied cognition assume that organisms can act, react and interact in 
psychologically pertinent ways without representing, reasoning or thinking about the world in 
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contentful ways. In sum, radical enactivism offers a fundamentally different vision of what unifies 
psychology than that proposed by cognitivism.  
 
Tu quoque? 
 
As a proposal for unifying psychology, doesn’t radical enactivism encounter the inverse problem that 
cognitivism faces? Surely, it too suffers from a problem of scope: some mental activity must be too 
off-line, plastic and flexible to be explained without appeal to the manipulation of contentful attitudes 
with genuine representational properties. Arguably, we can go much further than cognitivists suppose 
before we need to introduce anything like mental states with representational content, but we can’t go 
the whole way. If so, how can radical enactivism provide a properly unified and complete account of 
the nature of mental states? 
 Fans of radical enactivism recognize this problem. Certain human forms of cognition require (or 
seem to require) explanation of the capacity to adopt “the objectifying stance, i.e., the ability to 
neutralize the presence of existing meanings, and the symbolizing stance, i.e., the ability to impute 
additional layers of meaning” (Froese 2012, p 214). But the idea that this is a serious problem for 
radical enactivism is only apparent, not real. Radical enactivism need not, and does not, deny that 
there exist some forms of psychological activity that involve contentful states of mind.  Nevertheless 
it assumes that sophisticated linguistic competence is a pre-requisite for having and attributing 
contentful mental states. Thus radical enactivism takes very seriously the idea that the sort of 
meaning-making and content-based capacities Froese describes emerge through actively engaging in 
shared linguistic practices. 
 In the human case, this is made possible by the development of sophisticated linguistic abilities 
that both enable and are enabled by, engaging in practices such as pretence, conversation and 
narrative story-telling. These make new and non-basic kinds of cognition, interpersonal relating and 
ways of understanding possible. This is how new forms of mentality (and capacities for 
understanding minds of this sort) – those that bear the hallmarks of folk psychology – come into 
being. Highlighting just this, Bruner (1990) argues convincingly that folk psychology is an instrument 
of culture. The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) is an advance on Bruner’s idea (Hutto 2007). It 
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shows why Bruner’s proposal deserves a place at the table in current debates about the basis of our 
folk psychological abilities (Hutto 2008).  
 The NPH says that the normal route through which we acquire our sophisticated capacity for 
making sense of and acting for reasons involves active engagement in narrative practices. It is by 
participating in narrative practices (in which the participants jointly attend to stories about people 
who act for reasons) that children gradually come to see the connections between mental states and 
thereby acquire their full-fledged folk psychological competence. These story-telling activities 
involve the use of special kinds of narratives – which are public artifacts. The narratives in question 
have a special content and structure, they are narratives whose subject matter makes explicit mention 
of how mental states figure in the lives, history and larger projects of their owners. The NPH 
acknowledges and makes much of the fact that: 
 
There is a homologous relationship between folk psychological notions of mind and the 
traditional structure of narrative. In the tradition of story making and storytelling, agents are 
implicated in actions that are shaped by their intentional states and these actions have the 
objective of achieving certain goals (White 2004, p. 25, Bruner 1990). 
 
This enculturation occurs over the course of later childhood, especially from age five years onwards. 
Through participating in narrative practices children gradually come by a mature understanding of 
intentional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, hopes, and their possible relations.  
 The NPH recognizes that folk psychology is a highly structured, conceptually based, competence. 
But it assumes that it is an environmentally scaffolded competence and, hence, implies that it does not 
have a wholly internal, neural basis. Rather, in line with Sterelny’s (2010) scaffolded mind hypothesis 
the NPH assumes that “human cognitive capacities both depend on and have been transformed by 
environmental resources” (p. 472). The general idea of a socially scaffolded mind fits tidily within the 
general framework of enactivism. For when first explicating the idea that mind is best conceived as a 
kind of embodied action, the founders of enactivism, Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), defined 
embodiment in terms of an organism’s various sensorimotor capacities – capacities embedded in and 
engaged with wider contexts not only of the biological kind but also of socio-cultural varieties. 
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 Thus, despite agreeing with classical eliminativists that basic minds should not be understood 
using a model derived from folk psychology, radical enactivists need not assume that there is no 
mental activity of the kind folk psychology describes. The major difference is that eliminativist 
endorse an exclusive scientific realism, holding that science, and only science, tells us what’s what 
and what there is. On this basis eiminativists anticipate and press for a total rejection of folk 
psychology if it is accepted that scientific psychology will mental states with content as the basic 
units of cognition. Eliminativism has been persuasive in some quarters. As a result of its influence 
folk psychology “hasn’t fared that well in the arena of professional psychologies. It is lowly ranked 
and marginalized by these psychologies” (White 2004, p. 20). This is a symptom of the fact that folk 
psychology is viewed as being unscientific and naïve in its conceptions of mind. Folk psychology is 
thought to be a kind of domestic anthropology and thus “mired in biases of local culture” (see e.g., 
Stich 1983). Hence folk psychology explanations are thought incapable of getting at the true causes 
of action and thus they are “not up to the sophistication and rigor required by modern psychology” 
(White 2004, p. 20).  
 But there is no compelling reason to deny that some of us, at least sometimes act in ways and for 
reasons that folk psychology correctly describes (see Hutto 2011b). There is no justification for 
concluding that our everyday self-understanding is a kind of illusion (one to which we have – 
somehow – at best become sentimentally attached) from the fact that folk psychology has limited 
scope that it has no scope. Crucially, the first step in understanding folk psychology and seeing its 
value requires acknowledging that its explanations do not compete with causal explanations in the 
sciences. Folk psychology trades in normalizing explanations rather than causal explanations of the 
generative or productive sort (for a full discussion of this point see Hutto 2011b). Folk psychology 
explanations come in the form of (usually, appropriately short) narratives. Functioning as normalizing 
explanations, such narratives make actions intelligible by providing relevant contextualizing details – 
sometimes these require mention of features of the surrounding environment, the person’s character 
or the considerations that moved them to act (i.e. moods, attitudes, the content of attitudes, etc.) or 
their larger ends and projects. 
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 Noting this, and focusing on the regulative dimension of folk psychology, McGeer (2007) offers a 
corrective to the reigning view about the primary function of its explanations – i.e. the idea that folk 
psychology functions like a proto-scientific theory.  
 
we overlook the way folk psychology operates as a regulative practice, moulding the way 
individuals act, think and operate so that they become well-behaved folk psychological agents: 
agents that can be well predicted and explained using both the concepts and the rationalising 
narrative structures of folk psychology (McGeer 2007, p. 139). 
 
Importantly, McGeer highlights that folk psychological ascriptions and explanations do not take the 
form of low-level proto-scientific theorizing aimed at prediction and retrodiction. Rather, first and 
foremost, such explanations feature in the normative game of giving and asking for reasons. This 
inspires the stronger thesis that we only become agents who act for reasons by mastering that game. If 
this is accepted then the standard reasons for thinking that we should take folk psychology and its 
concepts as constructs of mental states less than seriously are undercut (see Hutto 2013). We can 
accept that contentful mental states, although not the basis of all cognition, are as real as anything else 
and that folk psychological explanations work perfectly well within their own domain, while still 
rejecting the idea that folk psychological constructs can serve as good general models for all of 
mentality.  
 In sum, like classical eliminativism, radical enactivism denies that basic mentality and cognition 
should be modeled in terms of propositional attitudes. But unlike classical eliminativism, radical 
enactivism allows that propositional attitude explanations are appropriate in some cases. This is to 
accept that some organisms have more than one way of getting around cognitively and that some – 
language users, at least – are capable of genuinely contentful, representational modes of thinking and 
reasoning (even if these have a quite different basis than cognitivism supposes).  
 In this respect radical enactivism is appropriately inclusive and thus a better potential unifier for 
psychology than cognitivism. For whereas cognitivism is unable to accommodate radical enactivist 
proposals about the basic nature of mindedness, radical enactivists can make room for appropriately 
modified cognitivist models of the mind, at least in some psychological domains. 
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